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COMMENT
THE IMPACT OF ANTITRUST*
JOHN PERRY MILLER**
I. INTRODUCTION
The functions of the antitrust laws have never been well articulated.
Some proponents of the law emphasize the economic benefits of
competition, i.e., incentives to economic efficiency and growth. Others
emphasize the political and social advantages of minimizing the con-
centration of economic power. A review of the history and present
status of antitrust suggests that both these views play a part. The
Sherman Act prohibitions of "restraint of trade" and "monopolizing"
suggest concern that entry into an industry shall not be barred by
arbitrary restraints and that decisions of various firms shall be
arrived at independently. This is not the same as requiring "compe-
tition" in the economist's sense, whether perfect competition or mo-
nopolistic competition with free entry. The Robinson-Patman Act,
Fair Trade Laws, Judge Learned Hand's decision in the Alcoa case
and the Celler Anti-Merger Amendments to section 7 of the Clayton
Act all indicate concern for the social and political effects of protecting
the weak against the strong and perpetuating several firms in an
industry, even at the expense of economic efficiency. No one can
understand the role of antitrust policy in the United States without
understanding the interplay of these two objectives.
II. SCOPe
Dr. Simon Whitney has undertaken to appraise by the case method
the impact upon business of the existence and application of American
antitrust legislation. "It is a practical study of industry and national
policy in action" and not "a theoretical study of monopoly or compe-
tition."' The focus is upon the economic impact of antitrust, i.e.,
the role which antitrust legislation has played in the present com-
petitive status of some twenty industries rather than upon its social
and political significance. Although he has not emphasized the point,
* This paper is a review of Dr. Simon Whitney's Antitrust Policies: Ameri-
can Experience in Twenty Industries. (Two volumes. New York: The Twen-
tieth Century Fund, 1958. Vol. I, xxxiii, 560; vol. II, x, 541. $10.00. Herein-
after cited WmTNEY.)
* *Professor of Economics and Director of the Division of Social Sciences,
Yale University; author of numerous publications including Unfair Com-
petition (1941) and Pricing of Military Procurements (1949).
1. 1 WHITNEY at 13.
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Dr. Whitney's concern is with the effects of changing legislation en-
forced with varying administrative vigor and legal interpretation.
He is not concerned with the potential impact of a fixed interpreta-
tion of our antitrust legislation, ideal or otherwise, vigorously en-
forced. The choice of industries was designed to provide "an unbiased
sample." It includes "the two largest mineral industries-bituminous
coal and petroleum-and the industry with the largest sales in each
of six broad classes into which the Census of Manufactures could
logically be divided."2 These latter include meatpacking, cotton tex-
tiles, paper, chemical manufacturers, steel and automobiles. To these
eight studies were added twelve industries which have been involved
in notable antitrust decisions: cast iron pipe, tobacco products, anthra-
cite coal, aluminum, shoe machinery, motion pictures, tin cans, farm
machinery, corn refining, cement, pullman cars and insurance.3
III. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
The problem posed by Dr. Whitney is a narrow but difficult one:
the effect of antitrust policies on the structure and behavior of indus-
try. The central question is not whether an industry is "workably"
or "adequately" competitive or whether alternative applications of
antitrust might have led to improvement in the structure or perform-
ance of the industry, although there are many obiter dicta about these
matters,4 but simply how industry differs because of antitrust. It is
presumably this narrow focus of the problem which accounts for
the absence of a general statement of Dr. Whitney's views of the
nature of competition and monopoly and the kinds of evidence which
are significant in indicating the effects of antitrust policies. The
absence of some analytical framework reduces the value and con-
clusiveness of the individual studies. It is only by indirection that
one gathers Dr. Whitney's views on the significance of structure, be-
havior and performance as guides to public policy.
While I am thoroughly sympathetic with eclecticism in the selec-
tion of evidence, it is useful to specify what one is collecting evidence
about. One thinks immediately of structural characteristics such as
the number and characteristics of firms and the ease of entry and of
performance characteristics such as the allocation of resources, distri-
bution of income, and the rate of economic progress. While these
matters are all touched upon at points in the individual studies, the
issues are not clearly defined. The volumes would have been more
useful had the analytical framework been explicit. I sense that Dr.
2. Id. at 12.
3. Id. at 13.
4. See particularly the "Summary" and "In Brief" statements at end of
each case study.
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Whitney is skeptical about the use of economic analysis. He believes
that the case method has "the advantage of setting forth the facts
in orderly fashion and, it is hoped, clarifying the important issues even
if not resolving all of them."'5 But a "setting forth of facts in orderly
fashion" depends upon some definition of order. It is precisely here
that the body of economic analysis is useful. As a result of Dr.
Whitney's caution in the use of economic analysis he misses many
opportunities to point out the significance of his data, to clear the air
of specious arguments and to aid the reader in choosing between con-
flicting interpretations of particular circumstances.
IV. MAJOR CONTRIBUTIONS
It is not feasible to do justice to the studies of twenty individual
industries presented in substantial detail and with much care. Al-
though these studies depend in substantial part on secondary sources,
Dr. Whitney has in several cases undertaken original research by
questionnaire or field surveys to determine the effects of particular
antitrust decrees. While many will differ as to the judgments of the
author, the adequacies of his theoretical structure and the conclusive-
ness of his evidence, all students of antitrust matters will find in
these volumes useful summaries of the structure and behavior of the
industries involved, and of antitrust proceedings therein. The foot-
notes provide valuable bibliographical material.
Dr. Whitney clearly believes that our antitrust laws have made a
significant contribution to the competitiveness of American society and
that this competitiveness is desirable. However, he believes that the
greater productivity and progress of the American economy arises only
in part from the policy of competition. He mentions five other factors
as being of significance: our natural resources; the size of the home
market; the political policies and traditions which have protected
property and contract and otherwise facilitated business; the relative
freedom from wars and devastation of war; and psychological and
social factors conducive to enterprise and competition.6
In two summary chapters, Dr. Whitney comments on various eco-
nomic characteristics of the twenty industries and ventures cautious
generalizations about the effects of antitrust policy upon them. His
comments on such problems as administered prices, non-price compe-
tition, advertising, interlocking directorates, and vertical integration
are brief and on the whole not very penetrating. For example, on
the subject of vertical integration he points out that in the opinion
of some commentators the legal attack upon vertical integration is
5. 1 WHITNEY 12.
6. 2 id. at 434-35.
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misplaced since the danger to the nonintegrated firm arises only when
there is some horizontal control in one market. He notes that others
argue that since some horizontal controls cannot be broken, control
of vertical integration is the only solution. He then comments: "If
that is so, such an assault would first require a careful balancing of
possible losses to competitors from integration against possible gains
to consumers."1 But these conflicting views suggest the need for
analysis, and one might expect that the case studies would illuminate
the problem. Granted that in most industries there is some degree
of market power exercised by many firms, under what conditions and
in what sense does vertical integration strengthen this policy? The
discussion of vertical integration does not get very far unless one
distinguishes between the effects of integration upon the allocation
of resources, the number of independent firms, the number of points
of initiative and the incentives to innovation. Those who have mini-
mized the effects of vertical integration are clearly concerned with
the problem of the extension of monopoly power in the sense of the
power to effect the allocation of economic resources. Others have been
more concerned with the protection of independent firms and the
encouragement of their survival. This interest may arise from pre-
suppositions concerning the processes of innovation or from a concern
for the survival of smaller independent firms per se. Dr. Whitney has
little if anything to say on these issues. Yet in fourteen of the in-
dustries studied, vertical integration has been an important issue, and
in eight of these industries there has been court action affecting inte-
gration in one way or another.8 Is this paucity of light an inherent
limitation of the case method? I think not. But it does suggest the
need for placing the case studies in proper perspective by more
detailed analysis of the competitive process.
Dr. Whitney presents several interesting conclusions, however,
concerning the effects of antitrust action. Collusive agreements with
respect to prices or output have been attacked in sixteen of the in-
dustries studied. Dr. Whitney believes that enforcement of the anti-
trust laws has not only been effective in eliminating these agreements
but has discouraged agreements in other industries as well. While
he believes that they have discouraged cartelization such as has "done
so much to fetter competition in several European countries," he
believes that "agreements would usually tend to break down in a
country with the individualistic traditions of the United States."D
I conclude that he believes our policy toward collusive agreements
7. Id. at 406.
8. Id. at 405-06.
9. Id. at 394.
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is on the whole desirable, an opinion which most American students
of the subject share. But one might ask why it is important to pro-
hibit them if they are likely to break down anyway? In Great Britain
and Europe many have argued that restrictive policies may in some
cases do substantial good. It is disappointing that these issues are not
explored.
In commenting on the basing point system of pricing in the cement
industry, the author minimizes the effect of the decision although he
believes that "abolition of the formal pattern by which each firm's
selling price was automatically determined by a pricing system is
healthy."'u But it is his general belief that outlawing the basing point
system while permitting individual freight absorption will have
little effect upon the actual prices paid in many industries." He
believes, in short, that the Federal Trade Commission's great victory
is likely to have little effect.12
In discussing the role of unfair competitive practices in the develop-
ment of monopoly, he concludes that the experience since 1914 "indi-
cates that their importance was very much exaggerated, and theory
suggests that a firm not possessing monopoly power from some other
cause to begin with has very limited ability to coerce suppliers or
customers. The prohibitions of unfair competition, price discrimina-
tion and tying clauses put into the law under President Wilson are,
nevertheless, valuable additions."' 3
Dr. Whitney believes that artificial barriers to entry have been
rare in the industries he studied, though he notes increasing difficul-
ties of entry arising from large capital requirements and other factors.
Nevertheless, he concludes that although increasing difficulty of entry
has lessened competitive protection to consumers, there have been
compensations. "[T]he same development that reduced entry [i.e.,
adoption of machine processes] has raised productivity."' 4 But are
we sure that these giants are efficient? What of the wastes of com-
petition between giants? Who benefits from this productivity-con-
sumers, labor or investors? He also argues that the lower risks of
established companies make it possible to attract funds more cheaply
and is "thus associated with lower costs and lower prices."'1 5 This
is an appealing, plausible, but undocumented conclusion.
Perhaps most interesting are Dr. Whitney's comments on the role
of dissolution in the promotion of competition. He notes a tendency
for oligopoly to replace monopoly in those industries which were
10. Id. at 320.
11. Id. at 395.
12. See also comments on basing point system in steel, 1 WmTNEY ch. 5, 287.
13. 2 WHITNEY 399.




originally dominated by a single firm. Dr. Whitney credits dissolution
with modest achievements. He notes that dissolution in the oil, tobacco
and explosive industries proved beneficial but he also asserts "that
failure to dissolve four other big trusts (tin cans, steel, farm machin-
ery, aluminum) did not prevent these industries from developing in
about the same way as the first three."' 6 He believes that "a dominant
firm is not likely-if an industry's technology is free-to retain its
original share of the market even if it is not dissolved by antitrust
action."17 He attributes this not to the fact that small firms are more
efficient but "that there are psychological, political and managerial
obstacles that prevent a giant firm from growing at the same per-
centage rate as smaller firms. Even if a big concern is able to manu-
facture a product as cheaply as its competitors, it may shrink from
trying to double its output and market, whereas any one or several of
the smaller firms may struggle to accomplish this very thing."'8 He
explains the failure of competitors to the United Shoe Machinery
Company to develop by "this firm's control over the whole technology
of its industry."' 9 Although he believes that divorcement in anthra-
cite, the Pullman case and motion pictures made for a more open
market, he questions whether the practical benefits have been im-
pressive. Yet he believes the corn refining, farm machinery and meat
industries, despite modest divestitures and correspondingly modest
results, have developed in a competitive fashion. For him, "dissolution
under the antitrust laws has, then, served a useful function in some
instances, by shortening the period needed for competition to assert
itself against an original near-monopoly; but it has not achieved, and
has not seemed likely to achieve, valuable results when used in
oligopoly situations. ' 20 Should dissolution be pushed further? Dr.
Whitney believes not. He rejects proposals that industry be frag-
mented by vertical and horizontal disintegration and other means
because such industries "would not be dynamic or progressive . . .
the hope of winning profits which certain kinds of monopolistic
position provide is a driving force for both business firm and in-
dividual ... not competition alone, but the combined force supplied
by competition and by ambitions of a noncompetitive nature, will
make a progressive economy."21 Referring to the contrary view of
Walter Adams,22 he remarks that "no evidence was found that the
16. Id. at 390.
17. Id. at 387.
18. Ibid.
19. Id. at 388.
20. Id. at 390.
21. Id. at 438.
22. Adams, Dissolution, Divorcement, Divestiture: The Pyrrhic Victories of
Antitrust, 5 IND. L. J. 1 (1951).
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industries in which these 'Pyrrhic victories' occurred, or others con-
taining big corporations that might seem ripe for dissolution under
these principles, operate less efficiently for the public welfare than
industries composed of many small firms."23
It is clear that Dr. Whitney's test of public policy as applied to
monopoly and oligopoly is "efficiency of operation for the public
welfare," but one seeks in vain for a definition of "efficiency of
operation" or "the public welfare." His comments on the role of the
search for monopoly position are reminiscent of similar remarks by
the late Joseph Schumpeter.24 Although this position has been
embraced by many in recent years, it is a view which is neither well
articulated nor well documented. To recognize the inevitability and
desirability of some monopolistic elements in an economic sense
represents progress. That pure competition should be rejected as
impossible and unrestrained monopoly rejected as undesirable, most
would agree. But this poses a problem. What kinds of monopolistic
positions should be permitted? What should firms in such monopolistic
positions be permitted to do in furtherance of their objective of greater
profits? Most would agree that vertical integration, tying and
exclusive dealing contracts, and discrimination presuppose some
element of monopoly power. One must assume that firms engaging
in these practices believe that they will increase the value of their
monopoly position by such practices. If we grant this, it is no longer
possible to deal with a simple concept of competition. "Monopolistic
competition" is multi-dimensioned. The question is: what may firms
do to expand and defend their "monopolistic" positions? Herein lies
the problem of antitrust policy, to establish the rules for "monopolistic
competition." Economic analysis provides some tools but these must
be elaborated if we would understand the effects of particular policies
in particular situations. But for any policy to be meaningful, its
objectives must be specified.
V. CONCLUSION
The problem of assessing the effects of antitrust is a difficult one.
Dr. Whitney has approached the problem historically with "an order-
ing of the facts" concerning antitrust action and the changing struc-
ture and behavior of industry. But it is difficult to unravel the effects
of antitrust policy from the effects of other factors making for
change. The handling of the steel industry is a case in point.2 He
reports on the merger of 1901. But at no point does he venture to
indicate what effect the merger had on efficiency in the industry,
23. 2 WHNEY 392.
24. SCHTUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SociALIsM AND DEMOCRACY (3d ed. 1950).
25. 1 WHmTNEY ch. 5.
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the level of prices and production, innovation, etc. Moreover, although
he reports on subsequent mergers by other companies, he does not
assess their significance. There is a widespread view that these
mergers have had the effect of lessening competition and tending
toward monopoly. But has this really been the effect? An alternative
explanation of the merger movement in steel is that mergers were the
least expensive way by which successful firms could invade new
markets, a way by which successful management with capital could
be utilized most effectively to expand capacity. Until recently anti-
trust policy has on the whole been lenient toward mergers. What has
been the effect of this leniency in steel? Has its strengthened the
monopolistic forces or has its strengthened competition? What were
the effects of the steel decision in 1920 upon corporate policies in other
industries? This decision is credited with establishing the principle
that size per se is not illegal. Granting that this decision encouraged
growth by mergers in other industries, was the effect to lessen com-
petition or not?
As we clarify the law on various issues it is to be expected that
firms not parties to legal proceedings will adapt their policies ac-
cordingly. Any attempt to assess the effectiveness of antitrust policies
must be concerned, then, not only with the subsequent history of
industries subject to litigation but also with the effect of this litigation
upon the behavior of other industries.
What then can be done to throw more light on the effects of our
antitrust policies? Further studies of particular industries are in
order. But this calls for imaginative interpretation of the record.
Indeed, it requires a good deal of informed speculation and judgment.
A second approach might be through comparative studies of the
structure, behavior and performance of similar industries in different
countries. There is an increasing body of information on industries
in Canada, Great Britain and other countries. In some countries, such
as Great Britain, public policy has been substantially different from
ours. A comparison of the evolution of industries in various countries
should be suggestive if not conclusive. And in the case of Great
Britain, recent changes in policy with respect to restrictive practices
afford an opportunity for historical analysis of the effects of the
elimination of particular practices in that country. The value of
international comparisons is limited because of the difficulty of dis-
entangling the effects of antitrust policies from the effects of other
factors such as the differences in the size of market, in the relative
cost of factors of production, and in other social and political factors
affecting entrepreneurial behavior. Nevertheless, this is a promising
area of research.
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A third approach designed to throw light on the effect of antitrust
decisions in industries not party to such proceedings might be to
consult key corporate legal advisers concerning the effects of par-
ticular decisions upon the behavior of their clients in other industries.
It should be fruitful to follow up certain key decisions such as the
basing point decisions and various decisions limiting the scope of
patents to determine what effect these decisions had in other indus-
tries. What advice did counsel give their clients in the light of these
decisions? What changes in pricing or other policies were made in
such industries, and what have been their effects?
The untangling of the effects of antitrust policy is an important and
challenging task. Dr. Whitney and the Twentieth Century Fund's
Committee on Antitrust Policy recognize that his pioneering study
represents only a beginning. For all its limitations, students of
American industry and antitrust policy are deeply indebted to Dr.
Whitney. I hope that others will carry on the task.

